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Cross-cultural comparison of subjective concepts requires a common denominator serving as a
basis of comparison. For instance color concepts have been compared across cultures by asking
informants to divide the optical spectrum into named colors. Unfortunately similar elegant phys-
ical parameters are not always available. A case in point may be the cross-cultural comparison
of conceptions of causality discussed recently in Frontiers by Widlok (2014). A current approach
has contrasted "Western" concepts with non-Western “religious” and “magical” concepts. Widlok
has questioned this approach and, relying on an exploration of relevant ethnographic observa-
tions, he has proposed an alternative approach of causal cognition involving two parameters: (a)
the temporal dimension of sequence, and (b) the concept of agency.
One can very well imagine “time” as a basis of cross-cultural comparison as the optical spectrum
is. However, “agency” seems quite a different matter. Exploring concepts of agency in the ethno-
graphic literature, Widlok comes upon distinctions such as between “natural” causes versus causes
involving “personhood.” However, it may not always be clear how similar distinctions may map
particular culture-specific conceptions of causality involving, for instance, magical and spiritual
forces. Hence in the following a formal non-physical basis of comparison is proposed.
In order to compare cognition across cultures we should proceed from a universal feature of cog-
nition. A similar feature would be the organization of cognition into entities and relations reflected
by the linguistic noun-verb distinction (Bever, 1970). Using entities and relations as basic cognitive
units of analysis, cross-cultural research may tie in with studies involving predominantly Western
educated subjects reviewed in the theoretical and discussion sections of two articles available by
internet (Peeters, 2004; Peeters and Hendrickx, 2007). For instance, if relations are represented as
vectors (arrows), more informational weight seems to be attached to origins (arrow-tails) than to
terminals (arrow-heads). Being informed that John likes Pat, subjects attribute likableness to John
rather than to Pat. In order to be found likable, Pat should like John in turn (Peeters, 1983). This is
in line withWidlok’s (2014) observation that Westerners locate causality in the agent rather than in
the object acted upon. Replicating the related studies with non-Western Dinkamight yield opposite
results likableness being attributed to Pat rather than to John.
An important feature of relations concerns reflexivity. A relation is “reflexive” when it forms
a loop connecting an entity with itself, and it is “non-reflexive” when it connects one entity with
another entity. An all-important structural feature of the architecture of cognition seems to boil
down to the double possibility to have reflexivity either attended to or ignored. Attending to reflex-
ivity, subjects deal with entities as “self ” and “other” (SO-thought), whereas ignoring reflexivity,
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they deal with them in the third-person, as “he,” “she,” and “it”
(3P-thought). One general finding is that SO-thought is a hall-
mark of cognitive representations that are intuitively associated
with personhood. 3P thought marks rather impersonal cognitive
representations such as in hard natural sciences. For instance,
given the information that John regales someone with cake, an
observer may attribute generosity to John only if “someone” is
not John himself but another person (SO-thought). However,
in order to draw the rather impersonal inference that John has
resources enabling to get cake, the observer may ignore whether
the gourmand is John himself or someone else (3P-thought). The
connection of attention for reflexivity with attributions of per-
sonhood may enable to detect hidden homunculi that, according
to Widlok (2014), may be concealed in the curtains of mechan-
ical causal explanations. Alternatively, the disregard of reflexiv-
ity may reveal quasi-mechanical thinking about the action of,
for instance, magical powers that otherwise might be miscon-
ceived as intentional actions of quasi-human ghosts. Notice that
there may be no one-to-one relationship between SO/3P thought
and the use of correspondent linguistic codes in the communi-
cation of those thoughts. SO/3P thought is diagnosed indirectly
from the ways subjects accomplish particular experimental tasks
that are often more complex than the examples presented. It
may require some inventiveness to have them adjusted to cross-
cultural research that may proceed from hypotheses like the ones
below.
Hypothesis 1: Humans are Primarily Set for
SO-thought
Evidence is so far limited to Western data. For instance, in sub-
jective judgments of fairness, explicit 3P-shaped criteria of fair-
ness were found to be overruled by implicit SO-shaped criteria
(Peeters, 1987, 1991). In another study (Peeters et al., 2003) par-
ticipants were instructed to imitate an experimenter who pointed
to a picture of himself ignoring the participant’s picture also
present. From age five on participants pointed to their own
pictures neglecting the experimenter’s (SO-thought).
Hypothesis 2: 3P-thought is Restricted to
Specific Domains of Cognition
In the above imitation experiment some adult participants
pointed to the experimenter’s picture (3P-thought). Being asked
why, they explained that they mimicked the experimenter
“exactly.” The term “exact” was not used by subjects using
SO-thought. This surprises because pointing to the own pic-
ture would be as exact—in the sense of “strictly correct”—as
pointing to the experimenter’s. However, for Dutch-speaking
adults “exact” connotes “hard science” that is a specific cognitive
domain marked by 3P-thought.
Hypothesis 3: 3P-thought Involves more
Intercultural Differences than SO-thought
This is a generalization from the observation that 3P-thought
is more flexible than SO-thought making that 3P-shaped cog-
nition varies more between and within subjects depending on
perspectives taken by the subjects. For instance, 3P-thought
seems related to expertise. Musicians presented with particu-
lar human-relations problems manifested SO-thought, but musi-
cians manifested also 3P-thought if the problems were framed in
a perspective of musical ensemble (Peeters, 2004).
Hypothesis 4: SO- and 3P-Shaped thought
Transects Habitual Distinctions between
Cognitive Domains such as between
Science and Religion
The absence of non-religious hard science in particular cultures
does not exclude elaborate domains of 3P-shaped knowledge. In
agreement withWidlok (2014), the modes of SO- and 3P-thought
do not involve a strict separation between religious and non-
religious domains. Western subjects deal with “religion” using
both SO-thought and 3P-thought depending on whether reli-
gion is viewed as a personal attitude or a doctrine (Peeters and
Hendrickx, 2002). Western psychological science has generated
3P-shaped concepts of justice as well as SO-shaped motivational
concepts that can account for the same data (Peeters, 1987, 1991).
Conclusion
Although the entity-relation approach belongs toWestern exper-
imental social psychology, it fits in with Widlok’s exploration of
existing ethnography of causality. The distinction between rela-
tions’ origins and terminals may capture some aspect of Widlok’s
dimension of sequence, and relations’ reflexivity may provide
an operationalization of personhood. Hence the entity-relation
approach may not only complete ethnographic observation but
also bridge the gap between ethnographic and experimental
approaches of cognition, which was a remote goal of Widlok’s
study.
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